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NEVOR V. MONEYPENNY HOLDINGS, LLC:
AVAILABILITY OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
FOR MIXED MARITIME LAW AND JONES ACT
CLAIMS
Adam S. Bohanan 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Among the many things to consider in a maritime personal injury
case, including the classic negligence elements of duty, breach, causation,
and damages, courts must decide whether and to what extent to assess
prejudgment interest. 2 Courts have traditionally seen prejudgment interest
as “part of the compensation due plaintiff.” 3 “The ‘essential rationale for
awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully
compensated for its loss,’ and ‘[f]ull compensation has long been
recognized as a basic principle of admiralty law.’” 4 The waters are
muddied somewhat when a plaintiff prevails on a mixed claim under both
general maritime law and the Jones Act.
In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard
an appeal of Nevor v. Moneypenny Holdings, LLC, a maritime personal
injury case that considered the availability of prejudgment interest on a
mixed claim of unseaworthiness at maritime law and under the Jones Act.5
The District Court had concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to
prejudgment interest on such a claim. 6 Moneypenny conceded liability but
appealed the award of damages and of prejudgment interest.7
The issue of prejudgment interest for a mixed claim was a question
of first impression in the First Circuit.8 The Court noted that the circuit
1. J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maine School of Law.
2. This is defined as the “[s]tatutorily prescribed interest accrued either from the date
of the loss or from the date when the complaint was filed up to the date the final judgment
is entered.” Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
3. Nevor v. Moneypenny Holdings, LLC, 842 F.3d 113, 124 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whitney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989)).
4. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189,
195-96 (1995)).
5. Id. at 113.
6. Id. at 117.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 116.
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courts that had previously dealt with this issue are split, with the Second
Circuit holding that prejudgment interest is available and the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits holding the reverse. 9 The First Circuit held that “when a
court, in a bench trial, awards damages based on mixed Jones Act and
unseaworthiness claims, prejudgment interest is available.” 10 This Note
explores the circuit split and concludes that the First Circuit was correct to
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning that a successful Jones Act claim
should not preclude prejudgment interest when mixed with a claim under
general maritime law. It will also argue that the First Circuit is correct in
its precedent that prejudgment interest based on future harm should not be
available.
In Part II, this Note will provide the legal background for the claims
at issue in Nevor, including unseaworthiness at maritime law and the Jones
Act. Part III will lay out the circuit split and discuss the facts, holding, and
reasoning of the Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases where prejudgment interest
is not available and the Second Circuit case where it is available. Part IV
will examine the factual and procedural history of Nevor and discuss the
First Circuit’s holding and reasoning. In Part V, this Note will analyze
Nevor in comparison to the cases from the other circuits and conclude that
prevailing on a mixed claim should not preclude the awarding of
prejudgment interest. Finally, Part VI will argue that, should this case be
appealed, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve this
now wider circuit split. This Note will conclude by arguing that the
Supreme Court should hold that the approach taken by the First and
Second Circuits is the correct one.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Unseaworthiness Under Maritime Law
Under maritime law, a vessel is considered seaworthy if it is “properly
equipped and sufficiently strong and tight to resist the perils reasonably
incident to the voyage for which the vessel is insured.” 11 Seaworthiness is
generally an implied condition of marine insurance policies. 12

9. Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1992); Petersen v.
Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 784 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1986); Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735
F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1984).
10. Nevor, 842 F.3d at 123.
11. Seaworthy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12. Id.
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Unseaworthiness can refer to a lack of proper equipment but can also
“extend[] not only to the vessel but to the crew” and their actions.13
B. Prejudgment Interest for Personal Injury Claims Under
Maritime Law
Although courts have not always allowed prejudgment interest for
personal injury claims under maritime law, the Supreme Court has long
held that prejudgment interest should be treated as part of the substantive
law that trial courts apply for two reasons. 14 First, the “‘proper measure of
damages is inseparably connected with the right of action,’ and therefore
is a substantive matter that ‘must be settled according to general principles
of law’ underlying the plaintiff’s claim.” 15 Second, the determination of
the “‘proper measure of damages’ necessarily includes the question of
whether prejudgment interest may be awarded.” 16 Thus, prejudgment
interest is part of total compensation in a judgment because it “serves to
compensate for the loss of money due as damages from the time the claim
accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for
the injury.” 17
However, until the early twentieth century, courts did not grant
prejudgment interest in personal injury cases. 18 Interest on judgments had
been allowed by statute since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and
prejudgment interest at common law began appearing on contract claims
by the end of that century. 19 Courts tended to avoid prejudgment interest
in personal injury suits on the theory that if a jury were going to make a
plaintiff whole with its judgment, then a separate award of interest would
be unnecessary. 20
Beginning in the early twentieth century, courts extended prejudgment
interest to maritime property damage cases, employing reasoning similar

13. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427 (1959). See also Cape
Fear, Inc. v. Martin, 312 F.3d 496, 500 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that crew procedures
may make a ship unseaworthy).
14. Michael F. Sturley & David C. Frederick, Prejudgment Interest in Seamen's
Personal Injury Cases: Supreme Court Precedent Lost in a Sea of Procedural Confusion,
33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 423, 427 (2002).
15. Id. (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916)).
16. Id. (quoting Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335
(1988)).
17. West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 n.2 (1987).
18. Sturley & Frederick, supra note 14, at 428.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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to that in breach of contract cases. 21 By the second half of the twentieth
century, admiralty courts were beginning to award prejudgment interest
on maritime personal injury claims as well, noting that it was unfair to
compensate ship owners for property damage more generously than sailors
who suffer bodily injury or death. 22 Currently, prejudgment interest under
general maritime law for past damages 23 is practically always available. 24
C. Prejudgment Interest for Personal Injury Claims Under the
Jones Act
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) was enacted in 1908
to allow for a remedy when a railroad worker has been injured or killed on
the job in the course of interstate commerce. 25 Although there is no
consensus, courts have, more often than not, concluded that prejudgment
interest is not available in personal injury suits brought under FELA. 26
In 1915, Congress passed the Jones Act, 27 which “incorporated the
provisions of [FELA] and, has thereby extended the protections afforded
by the FELA to seamen.” 28 Likewise, there is no clear rule on whether
prejudgment interest is allowed under the Jones Act. 29 Among the factors
that complicate the analysis is whether the action was for wrongful death
rather than for a bodily injury. 30 Still other factors include whether the case
was brought in admiralty 31 or at law32 and whether the case was tried

21. Id.
22. Id. at 429.
23. Prejudgment interest on future losses that have not yet accrued is never available.
See, e.g., Couch v. Cro-Marine Transp., Inc., 44 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 1995); Borges v.
Our Lady of the Sea Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 445 (1st Cir. 1991).
24. Sturley & Frederick, supra note 14, at 429.
25. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
26. Mitchell J. Waldman, Annotation, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest in Actions
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act or Jones Act, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 185, § 2(a).
27. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30106 (2012).
28. Waldman, supra note 26, § 1(c).
29. Id.
30. See Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that
prejudgment interest is not allowed for Jones Act claim for wrongful death).
31. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 85 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1936), rev’d on other
grounds, 300 U.S. 342 (1937) (holding that prejudgment interest is discretionary in
admiralty actions).
32. See Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 333 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that
prejudgment interest is not available in a Jones Act action brought at law). But see Trexler
v. Tug Raven, 290 F.Supp 429 (E.D. Va. 1968), rev’d on other grounds, 419 F.2d 536 (4th
Cir. 1969) (holding that prejudgment interest is available at law under the Jones Act).
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before a jury. 33 One situation that makes it particularly vexing for
understanding what courts think about prejudgment interest is when there
is a Jones Act claim mixed with one or more other claims and the judgment
does not specify on which claim prejudgment interest has been granted. 34
Federal circuit courts remain split on whether prejudgment interest is
available on a mixed claim. The Fifth Circuit has held that when there are
claims under the Jones Act and under general maritime law and the
damages are not differentiated between the claims, the fact that
prejudgment interest is not available under the Jones Act precludes the
award of prejudgment interest on the maritime claim. 35 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit has held that when “it is impossible to determine if the damages
awarded relate only to the unseaworthiness claim, prejudgment interest
will not be awarded at all.” 36 However, the Second Circuit held, in a
decision six years after Petersen, that when an award on a mixed claim
does not apportion the judgment by claim, the award should allow
prejudgment interest if it is available on either claim because this
“provides the most complete recovery.” 37 The circumstances of these
conflicting cases will be explored further below.
III. EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Prejudgment Interest Is Not Available – Fifth and Sixth Circuits
The Fifth Circuit considered the issue of prejudgment interest on a
mixed Jones Act and maritime claim in Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co. in
1984. 38 In Wyatt, the plaintiff was a kitchen steward on the defendant’s oil
rig. 39 The workers slept in shifts in shared sleeping quarters and would
often get in and out of bed with the lights off to avoid disturbing a sleeping

33. See Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming lower
court’s decision not to award prejudgment interest on Jones Act claim in a jury trial).
34. Waldman, supra note 26, § 2(a).
35. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 956.
36. Petersen v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 784 F.2d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing
Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 956).
37. Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir. 1992).
38. Wyatt, 735 F.2d 951. The Sixth Circuit adopted Wyatt in Petersen. Petersen, 784
F.2d at 741 (holding that prejudgment interest was not available under the Jones Act
because it was a jury trial and not available under maritime law because it would have to
be submitted to the jury and that even if prejudgment interest under maritime law had been
submitted to the jury, the maritime claim was inseparable from the Jones Act claim,
meaning that prejudgment interest should not be awarded at all).
39. Id. at 952.
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colleague. 40 Wyatt had an upper bunk and, because there was no ladder,
usually jumped down rather than risk stepping on the person in the lower
bunk. 41 On September 24, 1981, at around 4:00 a.m., Wyatt jumped out of
bed in the dark and injured his back after falling when his foot struck a
chair that had been moved. 42 Wyatt was hospitalized for six weeks due to
the injury and was deemed twenty percent permanently disabled after back
surgery. 43 Wyatt sued his employers for negligence under the Jones Act
and unseaworthiness under maritime law due to the lack of safe exit from
the bunks. 44 The judge ultimately concluded that prejudgment interest was
not available after the jury found that although the oil rig was unseaworthy
and Wyatt’s employer was negligent, there was also contributory
negligence on Wyatt’s part. 45
In appealing the denial of prejudgment interest, Wyatt attempted to
argue that Louisiana state law entitled him to prejudgment interest even
though he had made no claim under state law; the Fifth Circuit rejected
this and applied federal law. 46 The court noted that under federal law, it
could not grant prejudgment interest on Jones Act claims tried to a jury. 47
However, the court noted that it could grant prejudgment interest on a
maritime law claim tried to a judge or on a mixed Jones Act and maritime
claim tried before a judge, at the judge’s discretion. 48 Up to that point, the
Fifth Circuit had never addressed prejudgment interest in a mixed claim
tried to a jury. 49 In Wyatt, the court affirmed the trial judge’s reasoning
that, since prejudgment interest was not available on damages awarded
under the Jones Act by a jury, no prejudgment interest could be awarded
at all because it was impossible to determine which damages were
attributable to the maritime claim alone.50 The Wyatt court quoted the
lower court’s comment that “the plaintiff may not claim the benefits of a
jury trial on an unseaworthiness claim completely merged with a Jones

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 953.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 955 (citing Havis v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc, 664 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1981);
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973)).
47. Id. (citing Barrios v. La. Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1972);
Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1969)).
48. Id. at 956 (citing Ceja v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 690 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1982)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Act claim . . . and then attempt to unscramble the verdict after he
prevails.” 51
B. Prejudgment Interest Is Available – Second Circuit
The Second Circuit considered the issue of prejudgment interest on a
mixed Jones Act and maritime unseaworthiness claim in Magee v. United
States Lines, Inc. in 1992. 52 A jury awarded Magee a judgment for injuries
he sustained while working on a ship owned and operated by United States
Lines, Inc. 53 At trial, the parties agreed that the judge would decide the
issue of prejudgment interest rather than the jury. 54 After hearing from
counsel on the matter, the trial court entered the judgment, less six percent
for contributory negligence, but did not include an award for prejudgment
interest. 55 After cross-appeals regarding the denial of prejudgment interest
and other issues, the Second Circuit vacated the part of the initial judgment
that denied prejudgment interest. 56
In its opinion, the Second Circuit noted that Magee brought claims
both for negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under
general maritime law. 57 The court cited case law stating that a court may
augment an award for unseaworthiness with prejudgment interest, 58 but a
court generally may not add prejudgment interest to an award under the
Jones Act. 59 With regard to these two theories of liability, the jury had
answered in the affirmative as to whether the plaintiff had established each
claim “by a fair preponderance of the evidence.”60 After the district court
judge heard from counsel on the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to
prejudgment interest on the unseaworthiness claim when the jury had not
apportioned recovery between the two theories of liability, the judge held
that prejudgment interest was not available, relying mainly on Fifth Circuit
law as stated above, which the Sixth Circuit followed. 61 Here, the Second

51. Id. (quoting Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975).
52. Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 822.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Petition of the City of New York, 332 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 922 (1964)).
59. Id. (citing Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 592 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Circuit reached a different conclusion than the district court and the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits. 62
The court reasoned that it is hardly unusual for a tort claim to result
in recovery under separate theories of liability as it did in this case.63 The
court then gave a number of examples of situations that support its
preferred rule that “where only a single award of damages, not segregated
into separate components, is made . . . the successful plaintiff [should] be
paid under the theory of liability that provides the most complete
recovery.” 64 Further, it is settled law in the Second Circuit that
prejudgment interest should be granted on a maritime claim unless
exceptional circumstances militate against it.65 By the time of this opinion,
it was “well recognized” that claims under unseaworthiness and under the
Jones Act are like conjoined twins and that “‘since the recovery is the same
under either count, the question whether [plaintiff] recovers for negligence
or for unseaworthiness is hardly worth asking.’” 66 The court, therefore,
held that because there was no difference in the recovery under either
claim, there was no reason to deny prejudgment interest when it was
allowed under one but not the other. 67
IV. NEVOR
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Nevor v. Moneypenny Holdings, LLC, Judge Selya wrote for a
three-judge panel of the First Circuit and affirmed the district court’s
award of prejudgment interest on a maritime personal injury claim brought
both for negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under
general maritime law in a bench trial. 68
Plaintiff-appellee Kenneth Nevor (Nevor) had been a professional
sailor with experience sailing, repairing, racing, and transporting sailboats

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 695 (2d Cir. 1983) (federal
securities law and common law fraud and misrepresentation); Foley v. City of Lowell,
Mass., 948 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1991) (federal and state civil rights claims); Doty v. Sewall,
908 F.2d 1053, 1063 (1st Cir. 1990) (fair representation claim under Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act and state civil rights law)).
65. Id. at 823.
66. Id. (quoting Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 389 (2d ed. 1975)).
67. Id.
68. See Nevor v. Moneypenny Holdings, LLC, 842 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2016).
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and racing yachts. 69 After beginning to sail as a child, Nevor had competed
in a number of elite sailing races by the time he was thirty-five years old. 70
At the time of the incident that led to his filing the lawsuit, Nevor was
employed by defendant-appellant Moneypenny Holdings, LLC
(Moneypenny), the owner of a fifty-two-foot sailboat named Vesper and a
thirty-five-foot motor support vessel named Odd Job. 71
In March 2011, Nevor was among the crew members preparing the
Vesper for a regatta in the Caribbean.72 As the vessel travelled near the
British Virgin Islands, the crew was required to return to St. Thomas to
clear customs, but the Vesper would continue on without them. 73 The Odd
Job was dispatched to collect the crew members and take them ashore, and
once the boats were alongside each other, the captain of the Vesper told
Nevor and some of the other crew members to move from the Vesper to
the Odd Job. 74 Although the wind was blowing at a normal speed for the
time of year, eight to twelve knots, the sea was choppy. 75 Despite this, the
captain did not lash the vessels together before beginning the crew
transfer. 76
Because the boats were not lashed together, they separated just as
Nevor stepped off the Vesper toward the Odd Job.77 Nevor slipped as the
boats moved apart, and he reached out for the lifeline of the Vesper with
his hand and the Odd Job with his foot. 78 He managed to make it across to
the Odd Job, but the bicep of his right arm was torn from the bone by the
physical stress of the event. 79 Nevor stayed to help prepare for the race for
two weeks after his injury before returning the United States for surgery. 80
After the operation, Nevor underwent six months of physical therapy, but
upon completion of the therapy, residual atrophy was found in his
reattached muscle. 81 Months later, a specialist advised Nevor that his right
arm was weaker than his left and would probably remain so; the physician

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
Id.
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concluded that Nevor would no longer be able to perform the type of heavy
lifting required by his previous work on sailing vessels. 82
In June 2013, Nevor filed suit against Moneypenny in Rhode Island
federal district court, alleging negligence under the Jones Act and
unseaworthiness under general maritime law. 83 After a four-day bench
trial, the district court awarded Nevor “$1,460,458 in damages ($710,458
for loss of earnings and loss of future earning capacity and $750,000 for
pain, suffering, and mental anguish).” 84 The court later granted Nevor’s
motion to add prejudgment interest to the award, “which totaled $858,029,
[and] brought the aggregate judgment to $2,318,487 (plus costs).” 85
Moneypenny appealed, 86 conceding liability but claiming that the damage
award was excessive and that prejudgment interest was inappropriate. 87
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of damages in full
before moving on to the question of prejudgment interest. 88
B. Holding and Reasoning
There were two issues related to prejudgment interest in Nevor, only
one of which is relevant to our discussion. In addition to Moneypenny’s
assertion that Nevor’s success on his Jones Act claim should have ruled
out any award of prejudgment interest, Moneypenny also argued that, even
if Nevor were entitled to prejudgment interest, it should not have been
awarded based on damages for future harm. 89 The Court was quickly able
to dispense with the latter issue, as there was clear and long-established
law on the matter. 90
When considering the question of prejudgment interest on a mixed
award on claims for negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
under general maritime law, the court applied “de novo review to

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Moneypenny filed two separate appeals, but the First Circuit considered them
as one consolidated appeal. Id. n.3.
87. Id. at 117.
88. Id. at 117-21.
89. Id. at 121.
90. Id. at 125 (“In this circuit, the law is well-established that ‘prejudgment interest
should not be awarded on damages for future loss, either liquidated or unliquidated.’
Borges, 935 F.2d at 444-45 (collecting cases). This is a reflection of the commonsense
notion that interest should not accrue before the harm itself has occurred”).
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questions of law and abuse-of-discretion review to judgment calls.” 91 The
Court also noted that the First Circuit has never addressed this issue. 92
This section of the opinion begins with a brief discussion of the state
of the law in this area and sets up the circuit split as described above. 93 The
Court notes that prejudgment interest is generally not available in pure
Jones Act suits but is generally available for unseaworthiness under
general maritime law. 94 The Court then lays out the split over whether
prejudgment interest is available on a mixed claim, with the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits saying that it is not available and the Second Circuit saying that
is. 95
After setting the scene, which Judge Selya calls “the stormy sea [in
which] we must anchor our analysis,” he dismisses Moneypenny’s attempt
to avoid the issue of the mixed award by claiming that the district court
had awarded damages based on the Jones Act claim alone. 96 The order in
which the district court awarded prejudgment interest “explicitly found
that Nevor was entitled to prejudgment interest because the damages
award was, at least in part, under general maritime law.” 97 The Court found
that the district court’s finding that the damages award was based in part
on unseaworthiness was not clearly erroneous and that the district court’s
“characterization of its own findings is entitled to some deference.”98 After
noting that the district court, which was sitting without a jury, was
“entitled to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences,” the
Court concluded that Nevor’s damages award was, in fact, mixed. 99
The Court also dealt swiftly with Moneypenny’s argument that, “even
if the lack of non-skid product rendered the Odd Job unseaworthy, the
record does not establish that this particular unseaworthiness contributed
to Nevor’s injuries.” 100 The Court stated that, even if Moneypenny’s
assertion were plausible, it would not change the Court’s conclusion on
unseaworthiness, given that the district court’s findings on Moneypenny’s
failure to provide appropriate training and safety measures were “well91. Id. at 121.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 122 (citing Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F.2d 821, 822 (2d Cir.
1992); Petersen v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 784 F.2d 732, 741 (6th Cir. 1986); Wyatt v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1984)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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documented . . . and those findings are alone sufficient to show that the
damages award was based at least in part on a viable theory of
unseaworthiness.” 101
Satisfied that damages were based on both a successful
unseaworthiness claim and a successful Jones Act claim, the Court turned
to the question of whether the Jones Act claim precludes prejudgment
interest on the mixed award. 102 Assuming without deciding that a Jones
Act claim on its own would not bear prejudgment interest, the Court held
that “when a court, in a bench trial, awards damages based on mixed Jones
Act and unseaworthiness claims, prejudgment interest is available.” 103
The Court noted that, as opposed to some of the cases Moneypenny
cites, Nevor wanted the Court to grant a remedy that was available before
the advent of the Jones Act, namely the award of prejudgment interest on
a maritime law award. 104 The Court acknowledged that “‘prejudgment
interest traditionally has been considered part of the compensation due
plaintiff’” 105 and that the “‘essential rationale for awarding prejudgment
interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss’
and ‘[f]ull compensation has long been recognized as a basic principle of
admiralty law.’” 106 Prejudgment interest attempts to help make injured
plaintiffs whole, but Moneypenny’s view of prejudgment interest would
keep many successful plaintiffs from recovering all that they would
ordinarily receive from a claim. 107
A plaintiff recovering damages on an unseaworthiness claim, or any
maritime law claim, can lose the right to prejudgment interest if
exceptional circumstances make such an award inappropriate or
inequitable. 108 Exceptional circumstances could include “undue delay by
the prevailing party, exorbitant overestimation of damages, or bad
faith.” 109 The Court concluded that there was no such circumstance evident

101. Id. at 122-23 (citing Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427
(1959); Cape Fear, Inc. v. Martin, 312 F.3d 496, 500 (1st Cir. 2002) (both explaining that
crew procedures and not only the condition of the ship may make a ship unseaworthy)).
102. Id. at 123.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 124 (quoting Osterneck v. Ernst & Whitney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989)).
106. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat’l. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189,
195-96 (1995)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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in this case; Nevor “prosecuted his case forcefully, but not unreasonably
so.” 110
Next, the Court noted that although it has never addressed the exact
issue presented in this case, it has ruled on a sufficiently analogous case.111
In that case, the Court ruled that if a plaintiff “raises claims under parallel
causes of action . . . and receives a damages award straddling both of those
fully aligned claims, the defendant may not cite the presence of a more
restricted remedy on one claim to deny the plaintiff a more expansive
remedy on the other claim.” 112 Because there were overlapping claims with
one allowing greater recovery, the Court concluded that “the plaintiff may
choose to be awarded damages based on state law if that law offers a more
generous outcome than federal law.” 113
Ultimately, the Court held that the same reasoning applied here as
when “a plaintiff has prevailed on fully aligned Jones Act and
unseaworthiness claims.” 114 Because Nevor was entitled to prejudgment
interest on the unseaworthiness claim, even if it were a standalone claim,
“there is no logical reason why his broader success should strip him of that
entitlement.” 115
After settling the mixed claim issue, the Court overturned the district
court’s award of prejudgment interest based on future harm, saying that
the court “went too far.” 116 First Circuit precedent has long held that
“prejudgment interest should not be awarded on damages for future
loss.” 117 The Court concluded that the district court was bound to follow
precedent and that “its failure to do so constitutes reversible error.” 118

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 146 (1st Cir. 2009)
(explaining that “a successful plaintiff’s right to a particular remedy under federal law does
not trump his right to a more advantageous remedy under state law”).
113. Id. (quoting Tobin, 553 F.3d at 146; accord Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865
F.2d 1331, 1345 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that while plaintiff is “entitled to only a single slice
of the pie[,] . . . the choice of the slice [is] his”).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 125.
117. Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 444 (1st Cir. 1991).
118. Nevor, 842 F.3d at 125.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. First and Second Circuit Argument Is More Logical
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits held that on a mixed claim under
unseaworthiness and the Jones Act, a plaintiff is not entitled to
prejudgment interest. Although it is available on a standalone
unseaworthiness claim, it is not available on a standalone Jones Act claim,
and therefore the Jones Act prohibition “cancels out” the availability under
maritime law. This argument does not hold water. These courts point to no
analogous situation in which recovery on one type of claim renders
recovery on another type of claim invalid. It points to no analogous
situation in which the default position is to allow a plaintiff to recover less
than what is available. The courts here simply argue, with scant support,
that if a plaintiff cannot have one, then the plaintiff cannot have either.
This notion would strike many, including the Second Circuit and now
the First, as antithetical to the ideas that prejudgment interest is part of
what is due a plaintiff and that a plaintiff should be able to recover in
whatever way will come closest to making the plaintiff whole. Because
Nevor prevailed on his mixed claim under unseaworthiness and the Jones
Act and because the award was not apportioned between them, the district
court made the determination that if Nevor could not have one, he could
still have the other and be awarded prejudgment interest based on the
unseaworthiness claim. Aside from making more sense and there being no
logical reason for a judgment otherwise, this method allows greater
recovery for the plaintiff. It is unclear why the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
wish to penalize successful litigants. The First and Second Circuit
approach is more sensible and more appropriate to the task of making
plaintiffs whole again.
B. Trial Courts Should Be Clearer; SCOTUS Should Require It
A large part of the issue presented in this case and the cases like it is
that trial courts, either through a jury or judge, do not specify how much
of the award is based on each claim in a mixed award. Knowing that this
has caused consternation and has left avenues for appeal, it seems that
lower courts could easily avoid this situation by making a determination
as to how much of the award is based on each claim. This would give more
clarity to the litigants in a given case. It would also give more clarity to
future litigants as to what strategy they might pursue when making their
case. Further, it might reduce the possibility of trial court decisions being
overturned on appeal.
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More importantly for this case, it would obviate this circuit split
because if a court knew that, say, half the award was based on
unseaworthiness and half on the Jones Act, the court could then award
prejudgment interest on the unseaworthiness award alone and leave the
Jones Act award untouched. However, such determinations themselves as
to how much of the award is based on each claim would likely become the
point on which appeals are made. It may not make much difference how
clear trial courts are about what the award is based on if there is still a
difference of opinion about whether and when prejudgment interest is
available.
This leads us to the ultimate point of this Note. The Supreme Court of
the United States can and should settle this. As of this writing,
Moneypenny has not filed for certiorari, but if it did, this would be the sort
of long-standing circuit split that the Court might take on. It is difficult to
say how the Court would rule, but based solely on the idea that granting
prejudgment interest allows a plaintiff to recover more fully, it is likely
that the Court would agree with the approach adopted in the First and
Second Circuits and allow prejudgment interest on a mixed claim.
Hopefully they will get the chance to have their say.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the First Circuit likely reached the correct conclusion with
respect to the availability of prejudgment interest, the waters will remain
unsettled until the Supreme Court steps in to put an end to the debate
among the circuits. With no known petition for certiorari on the horizon,
that ship may have sailed for now. However, at least within the First and
Second Circuits, plaintiffs who wish to recover prejudgment interest on a
mixed claim for unseaworthiness and under the Jones Act now have
smooth sailing.

